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Abstract
This paper examines the causal effects of criminal convictions on labor market
outcomes in young men using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 cohort. Unlike previous research in this area which relies on assumptions strong
enough to obtain point identification, this paper imposes relatively weak nonparametric
assumptions that provide tight bounds on treatment effects. Even in the absence of a
parametric model, under certain specifications, a zero effect can be ruled out, though
after a bias correction this result is lost. In general the results for the effect on yearly
earnings align well with previous findings, though the estimated effect on weeks worked
are smaller than in previous findings. Results of a novel sensitivity analysis test how
the estimated bounds respond to a weakening/strengthening of two key assumptions.
Even under a significant strengthening of a key assumption a negative treatment effect
cannot be ruled out.
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1 Introduction
In April of 2011, the city of Philadelphia enacted a “ban the box” ordinance making it illegal
for employers to inquire into applicants’ criminal histories on initial job applications. Four
states have similar state-wide measures: New Mexico, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Minnesota.
In the same year, the U.S. Department of Labor released nearly $12 million to 10 organi-
zations to provide adult offenders with job market assistance. Motivating these measures
is the conventional wisdom that individuals with criminal records face unique difficulties
in the labor market. One statistic that might stand as evidence of the existence of these
difficulties is the observed negative relationship between criminal convictions and average
earnings. But to some extent convictions may simply be a mark of individuals with poor
labor market skills, hence the evidentiary value of this statistic is questionable.
The sheer number of people affected marks the link between convictions and employment
outcomes as an area that warrants attention. In 2009, nearly 7.2 million adults, or 3.1%
of the adult population, were incarcerated, on parole, or on probation (U.S. Department of
Justice 2010). These figures are significantly higher than they were several decades ago -
the correctional population has quadrupled in the last 30 years - and this trend has been
overwhelmingly concentrated among young, less educated men (Western, Kling, Weiman
2001). Given this concentration, any stigmatizing effect of convictions would work to further
hinder a group already disadvantaged in the labor market.
The labor market effects of interactions with the criminal justice system - be it arrests,
convictions, or incarcerations - are a well studied area in which several authors have used
various empirical strategies to point identify causal effects of interest. Freeman (1991), using
the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), finds individuals who had been in
jail worked substantially fewer weeks several years after incarceration (between a 8 and 16
week reduction). He employs both a simple cross sectional regression and one that exploits
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the longitudinal nature of the 1979 NLSY controlling for before incarceration labor market
experience. Grogger (1995), also addressing possible endogeneity concerns over convictions
with a fixed effect panel model, focuses on California data from individuals arrested between
1973 and 1987 to estimate the effect of arrests on earnings and employment levels over the
years 1980-1984 (using the ‘as yet to be arrested’ as a control group). He finds arrests to
have a negative effect on young mens’ earnings in the range of about 4% but that this effect
disipates after 6 quarters and the effect of convictions above arrest is insignificant. He also
finds simple arrests to have no negative effects on employment (even significant positive
effects) though multiple arrests have significant negative effects on employment lasting up to
five quarters. Allgood, Mustard and Warren (2003), also using the 1979 NLSY cohort, relying
on a selection-on-observables assumption, focus on youth (aged 14-21) criminal arrests and
convictions on 1983 and 1989 earnings, and find a criminal conviction causes a reduction in
earnings of 12% which lasts up to ten years. They also find being charged but not convicted
as a youth has no effect. Finlay (2008) using the 1997-2004 waves of the 1997 NLSY and
a fixed effect panel strategy investigates the effect of incarceration on several labor market
outcomes. He fails to find a significant effect on wages or employment but finds a very large
effect on yearly earnings in the range of a 20% reduction.
Another strand of the literature uses some form of experiment or instrument to identify
other specific causal effects of interest. Pager (2003) uses and experimental audit to assess
employers’ responses to job applicants with criminal histories. She finds white men with self
reported criminal records are only 50% as likely to receive a ‘callback’ from an employer.
Black men were found to be even more penalized for a criminal record and were only 33% as
likely to receive a callback (and this is beyond the already 50% reduction in callbacks non-
criminal black men received compared to non-criminal white men). Finlay (2008) investigates
how the expanded availability of criminal history data through the internet affects labor
outcomes of those with and without criminal histories. He finds the effects of incarceration on
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employment and earnings to be larger in states with open record policies. Kling (2006) uses
multiple estimation strategies, including using randomly assigned judges and their history
of leniency as an instrument for incarceration length, and fails to find strong evidence of
substantial effects of incarceration length on employment or earnings.
This paper investigates the effects criminal convictions have on several labor market outcomes
of interest and adds to the literature in two ways. First, it uses a newer data set than used
in most previous studies, the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and focuses
on 2006 labor market outcomes. Given the dramatic rise in the correctional population
in the last few decades this seems warranted. Second, this paper differs from previous
studies in the choice of identification strategy. In a similar strand to Kling (2006), given
the latitude given to prosecutors over charges and deferred prosecutions, one might consider
the variation in local district attorneys’ prosecution record (or a similar measure) as an
instrument for criminal convictions much as Kling used judges’ record as an instrument for
prison length. However, the exogeneity of this variable is likely to be more contentious as
the prosecutors’ record is likely to be much more reflective of local conditions. Furthermore,
using a fixed effect panel approach to capture individual heterogeneity as a means to control
for the endogeneity of convictions also seems less than appealing in the current setting as
many convictions appear very early in adulthood prior to much being revealed regarding
individual labor market potential. Thus, as an alternative, this paper applies a partial
identification strategy that derives its power from relatively weaker assumptions than those
typically imposed. Though point identification of the causal parameters is not obtained,
informative identification regions emerge. In particular, I estimate identification regions for
three causal effects: the causal effect of criminal convictions on yearly earnings, hourly wages
and weeks worked. In Section 2, I articulate the identification problem within the potential
outcomes framework and discusses in detail assumptions used in this analysis. Section 3
introduces the data, estimation methods and inference. Section 4 discusses results and a
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sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework and Assumptions
2.1 Potential Outcomes Framework
Causal effects are common subjects of interest in a wide range of fields. When the impact
variable is dichotomous, as in the present setting, it is convention to refer to the causal
effect as a treatment effect. The potential outcomes framework presented below provides an
intuitive setting in which to analyze questions of this sort.
Each individual j in the population J is characterized by covariates xj ∈ X and response
function yj(·) : T → Y mapping mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments t ∈ T into
outcomes yj(t) ∈ Y . The treatment is dichotomous: being convicted of a crime or not. Each
individual j has a realized treatment zj ∈ T and a realized outcome yj ≡ yj(zj) which are
both observed. Latent outcomes yj(t), t 6= zj are not observed. Treatment effect is defined
as y(1)− y(0).
A distributional characteristic of usual interest is the average treatment effect (ATE):
ATE = E[y(1)− y(0)|x] = E[y(1)|x]− E[y(0)|x]. (1)
The ATE is defined as the expected treatment effect if treatment were randomly assigned
to the population. If interest is in the ATE, what is problematic is that neither E[y(1)|x]
nor E[y(0)|x] is observed, but rather E[y(1)|x, z = 1] and E[y(0)|x, z = 0]. Given that
individuals self-select into criminal activities, and that these individuals are likely to exhibit
other unobserved characteristics which also affect their labor market outcomes, one is likely
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to be reluctant to assume E[y(t)|x, z = t] = E[y(t)|x]. This is simply the endogeneity
problem stated in a potential outcomes framework.
To see where further assumptions are necessary for identification, we can rewrite E[y(t)|x]
using the law of iterated expectations:
E[y(t)|x] = E[y(t)|x, z = t]P (z = t|x) + E[y(t)|x, z = t′]P (z = t′|x). (2)
The data identify sample analogues of all of the right hand side quantities except the counter-
factual E[y(t)|x, z = t′]. This might represent expected income under a conviction treatment
for those who actually received the non-conviction treatment. The data bring us part of the
way towards identifying the ATE, but the remaining distance must be covered by credible
assumptions.
Rather than resting on assumptions strong enough to point identify the ATE, this paper uses
several assumptions to partially identify the ATE. The main results of this paper emerge
from the imposition of three assumptions: mean monotone treatment response (MMTR),
monotone treatment selection (MTS), and monotone instrumental variable (MIV). These
assumptions are explained in full in the following sections2.
2.2 Worst Case Bounds
Even if a researcher is not willing to impose any assumptions on the response function or
selection mechanism, it is still possible to bound the treatment effect if the support of the
outcome variable is bounded (Manski, 1989). Though the counterfactuals in Equation (2)
are not observed, they can be bounded if Y has a bounded outcome space. Let E[y(t)|x, z =
2What follows is by no means a comprehensive review of the bounding literature which is a vast and
growing field. Rather what follows is a brief explanation of the assumptions used in this analysis.
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(t′)] ∈ [Kl, Ku]. Note that when Y is binary, these expectations can be viewed as probabilities
which necessarily lie between 0 and 1 implying the natural values Kl = 0 and Ku = 1.
When Y is continuous, the researcher may choose finite values for these parameters based,
for example, on the range of the data or relevant prior knowledge. Imposing a bounded
outcome space on the counterfactuals leads to worst case bounds on the unknowns E[y(t)|x]:
LBt ≤ E[y(t)|x] ≤ UBt (3)
where
LBt = E[y(t)|x, z = t]P (z = t|x) +KlP (z = t′|x)
UBt = E[y(t)|x, z = t]P (z = t|x) +KuP (z = t′|x).
Applying these results to Equations (1) and (2) lead to worst case bounds on the average
treatment effect:
LB1 − UB0 ≤ ATE ≤ UB1 − LB0. (4)
Worst case bounds tend to be limited in the information they convey because they necessarily
include zero. More informative bounds on the ATE require further assumptions.
2.3 Monotone Treatment Selection
As previously noted, exogenous selection is unlikely to be a credible assumption in the current
setting. However, a weaker Monotone Treatment Selection assumption (Manski and Pepper
2000) seems much more realistic:
MTS Assumption: Let T be ordered. For each t ∈ T , each x ∈ X and all (u0, u1) ∈ T ×T
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such that u1 ≥ u0,
E[y(t)|x, z = u1] ≥ E[y(t)|x, z = u0]. (5)
MTS assumes a characteristic concerning the relationship between the selection process
and the outcome process (in this context one should view the self-selected treatment as its
own realized covariate). Specifically, MTS presumes, for example, that those with a ‘lower’
realized treatment (z = criminal conviction) exhibit other unobserved characteristics that
would lead them to have no greater expected incomes under either potential treatment than
those with a ‘higher’ realized treatment (z = not convicted). This is precisely why one might
find standard regression methods unappealing in the current setting. One would likely be
skeptical of inferring a causal interpretation of the coefficient on criminal convictions in a
standard regression due to concerns over correlation between the regressor and the error term.
The MTS assumption turns this concern into an assumption to be used for identification.
2.4 Monotone Treatment Response
The Monotone Treatment Response (Manski 1997) assumption specifies a relationship be-
tween y(1) and y(0). It maintains that if treatments have some natural ordering then out-
comes vary monotonically with them.
MTR Assumption: Let T be ordered. For each j ∈ J
t1 ≥ t0 ⇒ yj(t1) ≥ yj(t0). (6)
In the present study, this assumption implies, for example, that yearly income for each
individual will be no greater if convicted of a crime than if not convicted. MTR also implies
a weaker variant:
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Mean MTR (MMTR):
E[y(1)|x, z] ≥ E[y(0)|x, z]. (7)
This follows from MTR by definition of the expectation function. Under this assumption,
expected incomes would be no greater for the population under a conviction treatment than
under a non-conviction treatment. This, though admittedly a strong assumption, seems
reasonable in the current setting and in accordance with previous literature. Furthermore,
as the goal is to identify a region of consensus as to the magnitude of the treatment effects,
results stemming from a relaxation of this assumption are given in the sensitivity analysis
section.
Though the worst case bounds depend on the imposed bounded support on expected out-
comes (Kl, Ku), bounds stemming from the imposition of MMTR and MTS do not. The
imposition of the joint MMTR and MTS assumptions can have significant identification
power and directly relate to the response and selection process. In what follows, mono-
tone instrumental variables (MIV) brings to bear a different type of assumption that, when
invoked along with MMTR and MTS, can further tighten the identification region.
2.5 Monotone Instrumental Variables
The method of instrumental variables is widely used in the evaluation of treatment effects
when endogeneity is a concern. Though standard IV assumptions can aid greatly in iden-
tification, the credibility of the instrument is often a matter of disagreement, specifically
whether the exclusion restriction is a valid assumption. This provides motivation for con-
sidering weaker, and thus more credible, assumptions to aid identification. First, consider a
mean independence form of the standard IV condition:
IV Assumption Covariate v is an instrumental variable if, for each t ∈ T , each value of
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x, and all (u, u′) ∈ (V × V ),
E[y(t)|x, v = u′] = E[y(t)|x, v = u].
A Monotone Instrumental Variable (Manski and Pepper, 2000) assumption weakens this IV
condition by replacing the equality with an inequality:
MIV Assumption Let V be an ordered set. Covariate v is a monotone instrumental variable
if, for each t ∈ T , each value of x, and all (u, u′) ∈ (V × V ) such that u2 ≥ u1,
E[y(t)|x, v = u2] ≥ E[y(t)|x, v = u1].
The instrument used in this analysis is the respondents’ test scores from the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) administered between the summer of 1997 and spring
of 1998. In treating this variable as an MIV, it is assumed that under either treatment, those
with lower instrument levels (low test score) have expected outcomes no better than those
with higher instrument levels (high test scores). This assumption stems from the belief that
standardized test scores are likely correlated with some level of innate ability or intelligence
which is valued in the labor market and thus labor market functions should be (weakly)
increasing functions in these measures.
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3 Data and Estimation
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from the 1997 cohort of the NLSY. The 1997 NSLY is a
nationally representative sample of nearly 9,000 youths born between 1980 and 1984 with an
over-sample of minorities. This paper’s population of interest is black and white men with at
most a high school diploma who are not enrolled in school (thus, in the above notation, x is
defined over gender, race, education and enrollment status). The income variable is reported
income earned from an outside employer for 2006. If self reported income is not available
but an income range is, then the mean of that range is used for yearly income. The hourly
wage variable is a weighted average of all wages earned from an outside employer, excluding
military, in 2006, where the weights used are hours employed. Weeks worked is the number
of weeks for which an individual reported having gainful employment. For yearly income I
restrict the sample to those reporting at least $5,000. For hourly wages responses less than
$5 an hour or above $50 an hour are not included. For weeks worked I restrict the sample
used to those working at least 1 week in the year. The conviction variable is based on self
reported criminal convictions not settled in juvenile court prior to 2006. Incarceration is
measured as if an individual spent time in jail during any week prior to 2006. There is a
potential concern regarding measurement error given that conviction status is self reported.
Though one is partially reassured noting that the frequency of ‘refusal to answer’ sensitive
questions in the NLSY questionnaire considerably declines in the latter years of the survey
compared to initial years, and that many refused questions are subsequently asked again and
answered in later years, the issue cannot be fully dismissed. While this issue is noted as a
potential concern, I do not directly address a solution. For a recent paper addressing such
concerns in a similar bounding framework see Kreider et al. (2012).
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Table 1 gives sample sizes for subpopulations used for the analysis of each outcome of interest
covering the non-convicted individuals, convicted individuals, as well as convicted individ-
uals who where never incarcerated. Due to different restrictions regarding inclusion in the
analysis, these sample sizes differ. When looking at the full NLSY sample of white men there
is a conviction rate of 17.1%, of which 36% spent time in jail, for an ever-incarcerated rate of
6.2%. For black males there is a conviction rate of 21.7%, of which 59% spent time in jail, for
an ever-incarcerated rate of 12.8%. When looking at these percentages for the samples used
in this study they vary due to individuals going to college or not being present for the study
or not being in the labor market. For example, of white men present in the 2007 wave and
valid for the study 24% were convicted of crimes verses 21.5% for black men. While attrition
rates are similar for the two groups (16.1% of black men are absent from 2007 wave and
17.6% of white men), college rates differ markedly for the two groups within the reporting
population (24% for whites and 9.5% for blacks). Furthermore, valid ‘participation’ in the
labor markets vary greatly between the groups as well with participation generally being
higher for white men. One should note that some who were not present in the 2007 wave
nonetheless have 2006 data available due to data being collected in subsequent years. This
is why, for example, there are more white men used in the weeks worked analysis then were
present in the 2007 wave.
Table 2 gives mean outcomes and test statistics based on simple bivariate regressions for mean
differences between convicted and non-convicted respondents. When looking at differences
in white men between convicted and never convicted individuals there are clear differences
with non-convicted individuals having higher incomes, wages, and weeks worked. When
comparing non-convicted individuals to those convicted but who never spent time in jail, the
differences still persist, though not always at the 5% confidence level (though well within the
10% confidence level). For black men, though the difference is present and significant when
comparing yearly income between non-convicted and convicted individuals, it disappears
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completely when the treatment group is those convicted but who never spent time in jail.
No differences appear at all in hourly wages for either comparison group, though differences
persist regardless of comparison group for weeks worked.
3.2 Estimation and Inference
Estimated bounds are functions of expected wages, probabilities of being convicted, and
probabilities of realized instrument values, all of which can easily be computed nonparamet-
rically. For worst case bounds and bounds under MMTR/MTS, these values are calculated
by sample analogs. For bounds under the test score MIV, expectations and probabilities are
estimated via smoothing splines (penalized least squares) using generalized cross validation
for the degrees of freedom selection. Although nonparametric estimators allow researchers
to estimate free of functional form, they are limited by the number of conditioning vari-
ables. The estimates in this paper condition on gender, race, education, enrollment status
and relevant instrument where an MIV is utilized. But this limited number of conditioning
variables should not affect the consistency of the results as long as the assumptions defined
above hold. Due to data limitations an increase in the number of control variables is not
feasible.
An important concern when estimating bounds with MIVs is that analog estimates of such
bounds exhibit finite-sample bias which lead the bounds to be narrower (more optimistic)
than the true bounds. By Jensen’s Inequality, the estimated lower bound on E[y(t)|x] is
biased upwards because of the maxima operator and the estimated upper bound is biased
downward because of the minima operator. To counter this bias, I implement a correction
proposed by Kreider and Pepper (2007). The approach is to estimate the bias by using
the bootstrap distribution and then adjust the analogue estimate in accordance with the
estimated bias. For a random sample of size N , let LBN be the analogue estimate of the
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lower bound in question, and let Eb(LBN) be the mean of the estimate from the bootstrap
distribution (a parallel procedure is used for an upper bound). The bias is then estimated as
Eb(LBN)−LBN . The bias-corrected estimate is then LBN −
[
Eb(LBN)−LBN
]
= 2LBN −
Eb(LBN). While heuristic and not derived from theory, this correction seems reasonable and
performs well in Monte Carlo simulations (Manski and Pepper, 2009).
Statistical inference for partially identified parameters is somewhat more challenging than
estimation itself and is the focus of a currently active literature. A consensus on the ‘correct’
type of confidence interval that should be reported is still evolving. The results of partial
identification analysis are regions of identification defined by upper and lower bounds which
contain the parameter of interest. When considering confidence intervals in these settings,
the question arises of whether to construct intervals over the region of identification or over
the actual parameter of interest. Intervals presented here cover the parameter of interest
with fixed probability and were derived by Imbens and Manski (2004).
4 Findings
4.1 Main Results
Results for white men are given in Table 3 and those for black men are given in Table
4. Note that since criminal convictions have negative impacts on outcomes, the largest
effect in magnitude is the lower bound. Initial worst case bounds on the ATE of criminal
convictions on yearly income are quite large and are not very informative.3 They confine the
identification region to a range of $20,000 and necessarily contain zero. Once the MMTR
and MTS assumptions are imposed the bounds shrink dramatically. For white men, when
3To obtain these bounds Kl is set to $15,000 and Ku is set to $35,000.
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including the full convicted group as the treatment group, they span the general range of $0 to
-$5,000; they then shrink to a lower bound of -$3,500 when the comparison group is convicted
individuals who never spent time in prison. This is a similar range for black men when using
the entire convicted group as treatment group. Adding the MIV assumption further tightens
the bounds on the ATE and signs the treatment effects away from zero. For white mean the
effect of convictions lowers yearly wages by at least $390 to $277 depending on the treatment
group and at most between about $2,500 and $3,500. However, once the bias correction is
implemented the bounds can no longer exclude a zero effect. For black men, when using the
entire convicted population as the treatment group, the joint MIV/MMTR/MTS bounds on
the effect on yearly income range from -$2,064 to -$433, this larger effect being about an 8%
reduction. However, again once the bias correction is included these bounds cannot exclude
a zero effect.
These finding are well in line with the results found by Grogger (1995). His results, after
adjusting for inflation, amount to about a $320 to $1,000 decline in yearly earnings due to
arrests. The results found by Allgood, Mustard and Warren (2003) and Finlay (2009) are
also well within the ranges found here.
Initial worst case bounds on the ATE on hourly wages span a range of $20 and necessarily
contain zero.4 Bounds under the joint MMTR-MTS assumptions significantly reduce this
range. The lower bound for white men, when all those convicted are the treatment group,
is -$1.59, though it is slightly higher at -$1.28 when the treatment group is focused only on
those who never spent time in jail. In this case the MIV, though cannot bound the ATE
away from zero, does tighten the bounds when the treatment group is the never incarcerated
group to a lower bound of -$0.58, though again this is gain is lost once the bias correction is
added. The analysis is not done for black men as convicted and non-convicted individuals
do not show significantly different outcomes.
4To obtain these bounds Kl is set to $5 and Ku is set to $25.
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Worst case bounds on the ATE on weeks worked span a range of 38 weeks and by definition
contain zero.5 The joint MMTR-MTS assumptions significantly tighten these bounds to a
range of less than 2 weeks for white men under either treatment group and about 4 weeks
for black men under either treatment group. The addition of the MIV then bounds the
treatment effect away for black men away from zero and cuts the maximum magnitude of
the effect on black men to almost 3 weeks when using men who were never incarcerated as
the treatment group. However, once the bias correction is accounted for none of these upper
bounds are significantly different than zero and the gain from the MIV is lost. Nonetheless
the upper bounds on the magnitudes of these effects are much smaller than those found by
Freeman (1991), though his focus is on having spent time in jail rather than convictions.
It is worth noting the differences in the effects for white and black men on wages, income
and weeks worked when the treatment group is changed from all those convicted to only
those convicted but who never spent time in jail. For white men, the bounds of the effect
of convictions tend to be similar regardless of the definition of the treatment group (though
slightly smaller when the treatment group is those who were never incarcerated, as one might
expect). This implies the pure stigma from having a conviction likely causes losses(since the
one treatment group was convicted but spent no time in jail and thus there is no direct loss
of experience). Yet for black men, though the effect of convictions on income can only be
bound when using all those convicted as the treatment group, when those who spent time in
jail are removed from the treatment group, those convicted and those not convicted do not
even have significantly different incomes. Also, under neither treatment group do convicted
vs. non-convicted black men exhibit significantly different hourly wages. Only in weeks
worked do black and white men exhibit similar causal effects of criminal convictions, in that
it reduces weeks worked under either treatment group definition. One might speculate that
this is due to black men already facing dimmer job prospects, so wages have less downward
mobility then white men, while it may still be harder to actually find work, thus the effect
5These bounds are obtained by setting Kl to 12 and Ku to 50.
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on weeks worked still comes through regardless of treatment group.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
One interesting question is how sensitive the estimated bounds are to a relaxation/strengthening
of the MMTR and MTS assumptions. Assuming MMTR imposes ex ante a non-positive ATE
while MTS imposes the direction of the selection mechanism, both of which can be strength-
ened or weakened.
Take the following modification of the MTS assumption:
(1 + α) · E[y(t)|x, z = u1] ≥ E[y(t)|x, z = u0] (8)
and allow α to vary. Setting α = 0.05 implies, for example, expected earnings under either
potential treatment for those convicted of a crime are at most 5% greater than expected
earnings under the same potential treatment for those not convicted of a crime (a weakening
of the MTS assumption), while setting α = −0.05 implies expected earnings under either
potential treatment for those convicted of a crime are at most 5% less than expected earnings
under the same potential treatment for those not convicted of a crime (a strengthening of the
MTS assumption). A parallel modification to the MMTR assumption is straightforward. A
graphical depiction of this analysis for bounds when using the full sample is given in Figures
1-56.
When looking at the lower bounds on the treatment effects (stemming from MTS and MIV)
one can see that even strengthening the MTS assumption by setting α = −0.1 still leaves
6Because the current application’s treatment of interest is binary only the MMTR assumption applies to
the upper bound and only the MTS assumption applies to the lower. If one were to apply this analysis to
the case of a multi-valued treatment one would need to take care and note that in general both the MMTR
and MTS assumptions apply to both upper and lower bounds.
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the possibility of a fairly large causal effect on all outcomes, and in some cases, such as the
effect of convictions on income, even setting α = −0.15 still leaves room for very large causal
effects. This implies that if one is willing go beyond simply assuming the direction of the
selection mechanism and even enforce a large impact on the outcome of interest from the
selection mechanism, a causal effect from criminal convictions still cannot be ruled out. The
effect of a weakening of the MMTR assumption results in trivial results due to the fact that
in the current application the MIV does not lend any identifying power beyond the MMTR
assumption on the upper bound (all figures are graphed post bias correction), though in
other settings where identifying power is gained by the MIV beyond that of MMTR this
analysis is likely to reveal interesting results.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the causal effects of criminal convictions on yearly income, hourly
wages, and weeks worked. Unlike previous research in this area which relies on assumptions
strong enough to yield point identification, this paper focuses on weaker assumptions that
yield tight bounds on the ATE. Imposing two relatively innocuous restrictions (MMTR and
MTS) stemming from economic theory regarding the response and selection mechanism are
sufficient to provide informative identification regions of the average treatment effects of
criminal convictions on labor market outcomes. Furthermore, using a plausible monotone
instrumental variable, standardized test scores, in many cases further narrows the bounds
on the average treatment effect and in some cases signs the ATE away from zero, though
after a correction for finite sample bias this gain is lost.
The bounds on the effect of criminal convictions on early incomes found here align well with
results found in previous studies. However the bounds on the effect on weeks worked resulting
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from this analysis rule out the estimated effect found by Freeman (1991), though estimated
confidence intervals cannot rule out his estimates. Interestingly, when those who have spent
time in jail are eliminated from the conviction treatment group for black men, there is
no longer a significant difference in yearly earnings when compared to the control group,
though the bounds on the effect on weeks worked are very similar under either specification.
Additionally a novel sensitivity analysis is conducted to test how the estimated bounds
respond to a weakening/strengthening of the MMTR and MTS assumptions. I find that
even significantly strengthening the MTS assumption still results in bounds that are unable
to rule out a negative treatment effect for the effect of convictions on any of the outcomes
of interest.
When estimating the treatment effects of criminal convictions on labor market outcomes,
endogenous selection requires the researcher to make explicit assumptions regarding data
generation. This paper has studied the identifying power of various assumptions. Assump-
tions directly related to the selection and response functions have substantial identifying
power. The inclusion of a variant of the traditional instrumental variable assumption yields
informative bounds on the ATEs but still fall short of being able to point identify the average
treatment effects. Stronger conclusions about treatment effects require stronger statistical
or structural assumptions.
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Table 1: Sample size of full NLSY sample and restricted sample for analysis.
exclude if ever incarcerated
convicted not convicted convicted not convicted
White men full NLSY sample
414 1,999 263 1,999
present in 2007 wave and valid for study †
240 750 141 750
sample used to analyze yearly income
194 676 117 676
sample used to analyze hourly wage
202 656 115 656
sample used to analyze weeks worked
236 776 144 776
Black men full NLSY sample
254 915 104 915
present in 2007 wave and valid for study †
130 476 54 476
sample used to analyze yearly income
59 327 29 327
sample used to analyze hourly wage
81 382 39 382
sample used to analyze weeks worked
104 435 46 435
† Valid for study implies not being enrolled in school, having at most a high
school diploma, and having a valid test score on record.
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Table 2: Mean values of outcome variables of interest and tests of mean differences.
exclude if ever incarcerated
convicted not convicted convicted not convicted
White men dependent variable: yearly income
26,261 31,218 27,710 31,218
(3.18) (1.83)
dependent variable: hourly wage
13.02 14.61 13.33 14.61
(3.15) (1.98)
dependent variable: weeks worked
43.04 45.73 43.59 45.73
( ) ( )
Black men dependent variable: yearly income
19,564 23,100 22,459 23,100
(1.92) (0.25)
dependent variable: hourly wage
11.96 11.87 12.13 11.87
(0.10) (0.24)
dependent variable: weeks worked
38.24 42.15 38.45 42.15
( ) ( )
T-statistics for mean differences are in parenthesis.
23
Table 3: Bounds on the effect of a criminal convictions on outcomes of interest under various
assumptions.
Worst MIV +
Case MTR/MTS MTR/MTS
White men dependent variable: yearly income
[-14,550, 5,450] [-4,957, 0] [-3,641 , -277 ]
{-7,261 , 0 }
(-15,613, 6,512) (-7,492, 0) (-14,198 , 0 )
dependent variable: hourly wages
[-10.17, 9.83] [-1.59, 0] [-1.57 , 0 ]
{-3.07 , 0}
(-10.51, 10.17) (-2.39, 0) (-5.31 , 0 )
dependent variable: weeks worked
[-28.17, 9.82] [-1.76, 0] [-2.57 , 0 ]
{-5.45 , 0 }
(-28.98, 10.64) (-3.10, 0) (-9.01 , 0 )
White men dependent variable: yearly income
excluding [-14,901, 5,099] [-3,508, 0] [-2,446 , -390 ]
those ever {-9,092 , 0 }
incarcerated (-16,005, 6,203) (-6,782, 0) (-21,558 , 0 )
dependent variable: hourly wages
[-9.92, 10.08] [-1.28, 0] [-0.58 , 0 ]
{-2.58 , 0 }
(-10.30, 10.46) (-2.40, 0) (-6.17 , 0 )
dependent variable: weeks worked
[-30.39, 7.60] [-1.55, 0] [-2.15 , 0 ]
{-5.22 , 0 }
(-31.22, 8.42) (-3.03, 0) (-10.17 , 0 )
95% confidence intervals are in parenthesis. For bounds under an MIV
Assumption square brackets contain uncorrected bounds and brackets contain corrected.
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Table 4: Bounds on the effect of a criminal convictions on outcomes of interest under various
assumptions.
Worst MIV +
Case MTR/MTS MTR/MTS
Black men dependent variable: yearly income
[-9,221, 10,779] [-3,536, 0] [-2,064 , -433 ]
{-4,837 , 0 }
(-10,363, 11,921) (-6,316, 0) (-9,948 , 0 )
dependent variable: weeks worked
[-28.15, 9.85] [-3.43, 0] [-3.49 , 0.03 ]
{-7.13 , 0}
(-29.21, 10.90) (-5.86, 0) (-12.37 , 0 )
Black men dependent variable: weeks worked
excluding [-30.45, -7.55] [-3.97, 0] [-3.19 , -0.03 ]
those ever {-6.25 , 0 ]
incarcerated (-31.53, 8.63) (-7.69, 0) (-12.46 , 0 )
95% confidence intervals are in parenthesis. For bounds under an MIV
Assumption square brackets contain uncorrected bounds and brackets contain corrected.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of bounds of ATE on income for white men to alpha.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of bounds of ATE on wages for white men to alpha.
Figure 3: Sensitivity of bounds of ATE on weeks worked for white men to alpha.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of bounds of ATE on income for black men to alpha.
Figure 5: Sensitivity of bounds of ATE on weeks worked for black men to alpha.
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